Modeling Human-Machine Interaction for the Assessment of Human Reliability by Schwencke, Daniel et al.
MODELING HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTION FOR THE 
ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN RELIABILITY 
Daniel Schwencke1, Jan Grippenkoven1, Karsten Lemmer1 
1 German Aerospace Center 
Institute of Transportation Systems 
Lilienthalplatz 7, 38108 Braunschweig 
Germany 
 
{daniel.schwencke|jan.grippenkoven|karsten.lemmer}@dlr.de 
There has been recent research on the analysis and assessment of 
human-machine interaction in railways based on barriers. Considering 
the theory of multiple resources, we take this approach further and 
develop additional assessment criteria as well as a more elaborate 
notation. We report on how the results of a simple assessment of 
some barriers compare to those obtained from a different method. 
Introduction 
Human error plays a crucial role in the majority of critical railway events. In the past 
the focus was set mainly on technical developments in order to improve safety. 
Operators were more and more replaced by technical systems to enhance safety. The 
corresponding shift from active physical work towards supervision tasks changed the 
requirements on humans and their working environment needed to enable reliable 
performance; in particular, cognitive aspects of monitoring became more important. 
The methods to analyze and assess human reliability that are used in railway practice 
today, however, most often do not adequately reflect these changes. Either they 
consist of oversimplified approaches to human reliability or they are based on 
approaches and collected data from other industries (e.g. nuclear industry or air 
traffic) with different characteristics and influencing factors. European endeavors 
towards a common risk based approach to railway safety increase the need for an 
adequate and quantitative assessment of human reliability. 
These challenges are addressed in the project SMSmod (“System Mensch-Sicherheit 
modellieren”) funded by the German research foundation (DFG). In this paper we 
present those parts of the project pertaining to further developments of a method 
proposed by Hammerl (2011). First, we recall the original method for the analysis of 
safety-relevant human-machine interaction and the assessment of human reliability. 
Second, we enlarge the set of assessment criteria of the method where Wickens’ 
multiple resource theory is taken into account (Wickens & McCarley 2008). Third, 
we revise the diagrammatic presentation which is part of Hammerl’s work and 
introduce a more explicit representation of the assessment criteria for safety-relevant 
human-machine interaction. Finally, we report on results of the application of a 
simple approach to the assessment of human reliability using the method. 
Modeling the Human-Machine Interaction of a Barrier 
We briefly recall the approach of Hammerl (2011) to the analysis of prevention and 
protection mechanisms (so-called “barriers”) in railways. This analysis mainly 
results in a diagram displaying the interaction of a human with one or more technical 
systems (referred to as “the machine”), the interaction implementing the safety 
function of the barrier. The analysis serves as a basis for the assessment of the 
barrier’s reliability, including in particular the influence of the human on the safety 
function, as we shall see in the sections below. It also serves to draw conclusions 
about the impact of human actions on safety. For a more comprehensive introduction 
we refer to (Talg, Hammerl & Meyer zu Hörste 2012). 
Barriers 
Sklet (2006) defines barriers as “physical and/or non‐physical means planned to 
prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents”. Hollnagel (2008) 
distinguishes four types of barriers: 
• physical barriers, which prevent an event from taking place or block or mitigate 
its effects by their mere existence, 
• functional barriers, which set up one or more pre-conditions that have to be met 
before an action can be carried out, 
• symbolic barriers like signs, which require an act of interpretation in order to 
achieve their purpose, and 
• immaterial barriers like rules, which lack material form or substance in the 
situation where they are applied. 
Moreover, barrier function and barrier systems are distinguished: the barrier 
function is the specific way in which the barrier fulfills its purpose. The barrier 
system is the organizational and/or physical structure, without which the barrier 
function could not be achieved. One barrier may consist of several barrier systems. 
Symbolic and immaterial barriers always depend on human actions, functional ones 
may depend on human actions, but often in a limited way. Physical barriers are 
independent of human actions and thus are not considered in the sequel. 
Analysis of the Human-Machine Interaction 
First of all we observe that for functional barriers the machine fulfills the barrier 
function, whereas for symbolic and immaterial barriers the human does. For further 
analysis, we decompose the realization of the barrier function into three steps: 
• barrier initiation (BI), i.e. information perception by the entity which performs 
the barrier processing,  
• barrier processing (BP), i.e. deriving the necessary actions from the 
information, and 
• barrier execution (BE), i.e. carrying out the derived action. 
Drawing the last two steps in the human-machine system, we obtain three types of 
interaction as displayed in Figure 1. Types A and B correspond to symbolic and 
immaterial barriers, type C represents functional barriers. An arrow between human 
and machine shows an information flow or an action, a loop on the human side 
describes cognitive information processing. The barrier execution arrow of type B is 
the only one that crosses the border of the human-machine system which is for 
example the case if a train driver passes information about an object on the 
neighboring track to the dispatcher. 
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Figure 1: Basic types of human-machine interaction 
In order to complete the interaction, different patterns for the barrier initiation may 
be added to the basic interaction types from Figure 1. Figure 2 shows on the left-
hand side the combination of type A with information retrieval from one barrier 
system with active initiation (a signal that requests the observer to do something). 
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Figure 2: Combination of basic type A with different barrier initiation 
patterns 
On the right-hand side, we have again type A which this time is combined with 
information retrieval from two barrier systems with passive initiation (the human 
needs to recognize the problem). 
In the same way, the basic type B may be combined with different barrier initiation 
patterns. For type C, we distinguish two kinds of initiation patterns: either an 
erroneous human action may initiate a safety function of the machine (type C-I), or a 
safety function may be deactivated by the human (C-II). For a detailed discussion of 
possible initiation patterns for the basic types see Chapter 6.2 of (Hammerl 2011). 
Safety Implications of Different Types of Barriers 
In Table 1 we give an overview of the allocation of the safety function and of the 
risk for the different basic interaction types. Using barriers of type A or B, a 
“normal” human error may directly cause a safety risk; using barriers of type C-I or 
C-II, a technical function is additionally involved. 
Table 1: Allocation of safety function and safety risk 
Barrier 
Type 
Allocation of Safety Function Allocation of Risk 
A/B  Human performs safety function Risk in case of a human error 
C-I Reaction of technical system in 
case of a human error 
Risk in case of a human error and a 
technical system failure 
C-II Human may deactivate safety 
function 
Risk in case of a technical system 
failure or an error of commission 
   
Table 2: Consequences of “normal” errors and errors of commission 
Barrier 
Type 
“Normal” Human Error Error of Commission 
A/B  Failure of barrier function (safety 
risk!) 
Useless execution of barrier function 
(possibly loss of performance) 
C-I Error is remedied by technical system 
(possibly loss of performance) 
Performance function not needed 
C-II Useless execution of barrier function 
(possibly loss of performance) 
Barrier deactivation despite needed 
barrier function (safety risk!) 
   
Consequently, we must distinguish between “normal” human errors and errors of 
commission (i.e. actions where the human operator acts in good faith, which are 
right on the level of the behavior, but wrong in the particular situation). As shown in 
Table 2, depending on the type of barrier and the kind of human error the 
consequences for safety differ. Most important are normal errors in connection with 
barrier types A/B and errors of commission in connection with type C-II since in 
those cases a safety risk arises. 
Criteria for the Assessment of Human Reliability 
It is argued by Hammerl (2011) that the human reliability is not solely dependent on 
the type of barrier (symbolic, immaterial or functional). The hypothesis which leads 
us to the assessment of human reliability using the “human-barrier interaction” is 
that an increasing complexity of the human-machine interaction is equivalent to a 
more error-prone barrier. Based on the above analysis of the steps (BI, BP and BE) 
for establishing a safety function, we next set up complexity criteria which may be 
combined in order to obtain an estimation of the reliability of barriers, see below. 
Criteria Given by Hammerl 
Table 3 gathers several criteria from (Hammerl 2011) that may be taken into account 
for the assessment of human reliability. 
Further Criteria 
As explained below, the theory of multiple resources already was the reason to 
incorporate the criterion “multiple use of a sensory channel” in Table 3. But it also 
leads us to additionally consider the following criteria in the SysML notation for the 
assessment of human reliability: 
• Barrier system: availability over time (a sensory channel is needed precisely in 
the time slot where the barrier system, e.g. a signal, is available) 
• Barrier system: number of supporting sensory channels (according to the mul-
tiple resource theory reception via different sensory channels is more reliable) 
• Whole barrier: further parallel tasks (the multiple use of a sensory channel may 
not only be caused by different barrier systems of one barrier, but also by other 
tasks that need to be performed in parallel) 
There are still further criteria we propose to include for the assessment of human 
reliability since they affect the cognitive complexity: 
• Barrier system: number of states of the barrier system carrier (less states better) 
• Barrier processing: probability to derive the wrong action despite good 
intention (assessment according to human decision making literature) 
• Barrier execution: ergonomics and usability factors (e.g. number of degrees of 
freedom to fulfill a task, feedback) 
Multiple Resources in Human-Barrier Interaction 
The incorporation of the concept of multitasking into human barrier interaction 
described in this section follows basic thoughts of Wickens’ theory of multiple 
resources (2008). One of the main premises of this theory is that the human capacity 
to process environmental information is limited. A key factor that determines the 
complexity of a working environment for the human is the temporal order of 
appearance of relevant information. Tasks can either be dealt with stepwise or they 
have to be coordinated with other tasks in a parallel fashion. 
Table 3: Complexity criteria for the human-machine interaction 
Criterion Effect on 
Reliability 
Explanation 
Criteria for the Complexity of the Barrier Initiation 
Barrier 
initiation 
Active better 
than passive 
Active initiation = by a signal/sign (i.e. from the 
machine side); passive initiation = the human needs to 
recognize a problem by himself 
Number of 
barrier 
systems 
Small number 
better 
The number of barrier systems the human needs to 
retrieve information from during the barrier initiation 
phase 
Spatial 
distance of 
barrier 
systems 
Short distance 
better 
The distance is short in case there is only one barrier 
system or several systems close by, e.g. on the driver’s 
desk; it is high if e.g. a driver needs to consider barrier 
systems from the trackside and inside the cabin 
Multiple use 
of a sensory 
channel 
The less the 
better 
Maximum number of barrier systems that require the 
use of the same sensory channel 
Criteria for the Complexity of a Single Barrier System 
Frequency of 
interaction 
Higher 
frequency 
better 
Describes whether interaction with the barrier system 
is an everyday task or rather seldom (e.g. rare signals 
or signs for the train driver) 
Presentation 
of 
information 
Explicit and 
unambiguous 
better 
Rates how easily information can be perceived and 
interpreted correctly subject to its presentation 
Criteria for the Complexity of the Barrier Processing 
Time between 
barrier 
initiation and 
execution 
Shorter time 
better 
The time period (the necessary delay of the barrier 
execution) in which the human needs to keep in mind 
the pending execution of the barrier (and in which he 
might forget about the remaining actions) 
Criteria for the Complexity of the Whole Barrier 
Available 
time 
Longer time 
better 
The time until the barrier function needs to be executed 
at the latest (which affects pressure/stress) 
   
The role of the factor “number of barrier systems” as described in Table 3 therefore 
has to be extended by the factor time. In human-barrier interaction the number of 
barrier systems the human needs to retrieve information from especially gets 
important when the time to attend all of the important information is limited. If the 
number of barrier systems that have to be attended at the same time exceeds one 
during barrier initiation phase, the problem of interference can occur due to the 
necessity of parallel processing and limited human perceptual resources. 
According to the multiple resource theory, when it comes to parallel processing in 
an early stage of perception, the modality (visual or auditory) addressed by different 
kinds of information plays a key role. This idea is tackled in the aspect “multiple use 
of a sensory channel” in Table 3. The negative effect of interference is the strongest 
if two (or more) subtasks demand processing in the same perceptual modality at the 
same time. In the railway domain, this could occur e.g. when a train driver 
approaches a signal besides the track that he should attend and at the same time has 
to monitor the tachometer and mile posts for controlled speed reduction. Note that in 
all of these subtasks the visual attention of the driver is required. A probable 
consequence of the resulting interference could be that one of the three sources of 
information can not be attended adequately (or is even missed, in case of the signal). 
The consequence would be disturbed barrier processing, which could either lead to a 
declined speed adjustment or even to a so called SPAD (signal passed at danger). 
As stated earlier, in early information processing the problem of interference only 
arises when the same modality is required. When multiple information occurs in a 
way that it touches different perceptual modalities (e.g. regarding a signal while 
listening to an operator’s radio message), parallel processing is usually less 
challenging. The incorporation of human processing capabilities under multitasking 
conditions over time is a major advance of the revised notation for human-barrier 
interaction presented in the following section. Note that there are methods like 
CPM-GOMS (Gray, John & Atwood 1992) that follow similar ideas but only apply 
to human-computer interaction which is insufficient for a train driver’s work place. 
More Detailed Interaction Diagrams 
Consider Figure 3 where the human-machine interaction was modeled for a barrier 
against speeding according to the method described above. 
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Figure 3: Barrier against speeding – simple diagram 
Steps 1-5 belong to the barrier initiation which involves the three barrier systems 
EBuLa1, mile posts and tachometer, steps 6 and 7 represent the barrier processing 
and execution, respectively (so this interaction is of type A). Some of the above 
                                                          
1 Electronic system on the driver’s desk displaying time table and speed restrictions 
criteria (e. g. whether a technical system or the human initiates the barrier) are 
visible in the diagram, others (e. g. the time between barrier initiation and execution) 
are not. Additionally, this notation offers no possibility to get an overview of 
interferences in human information processing during the parallel execution of 
different subtasks. 
Using SysML Sequence Message Charts 
We present a more elaborate notation for the human-machine interaction based on 
sequence message charts from the SysML modeling language (Figure 4). This 
notation additionally allows to model temporal aspects and to highlight how multiple 
resources are affected during parallel human information processing as well as 
different technical devices as part of the barrier. Most of the identified criteria for 
human reliability assessment become explicit in the new notation. 
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Figure 4: Barrier against speeding – sequence message chart 
The barrier against speeding from Figure 3 modeled in a sequence message chart is 
shown in Figure 4. Human and machine are decomposed into inputs, processing and 
outputs which are called sensory channels, deciding/processing and actions for the 
human. The human processing is divided into non-automated and automated (simple 
and frequently performed) processing. Time flows in downwards direction. The 
activity of a part of the human-machine system is indicated by the filled gray 
rectangles which are drawn on its dashed lifeline; for the machine outputs, the white 
areas indicate the availability to the human. The black arrows show the main 
information flow, the gray ones show supporting information flow. The area in the 
bottom bordered by the gray line indicates a closed-loop control. 
To meet concerns about limited human resources, the notation as presented in Figure 
4 offers the possibility to combine sequences of more than one task over time in one 
chart, to model parallel processing. The human-barrier interaction in the task 
“attending a trackside signal” for example could be implemented in the sequence 
chart of the barrier presented above. Overlapping rectangles on the lifelines e.g. of 
sensory channels or actions offer a direct visual impression of tasks in which 
interference could become a problem if they occur together at the same time. 
In the theory of multiple resources, besides the dimension of the perceptual modality 
(visual or auditory), Wickens (2008) further differentiates visual perception (focal 
and ambient vision), tasks (spatial and verbal codes) and stages of information 
processing (perception, cognition and responding). An implementation of those 
dimensions into the presented SysML sequence message charts appears reasonable. 
Human Reliability Assessment 
Application of Hammerl’s approach 
As demonstrated by Hammerl (2011), his criteria may be used to compare different 
barriers with the same purpose with respect to human reliability. Hammerl also 
outlines an approach capable of comparing barriers with different purpose. We 
report on our experience applying this approach, which so far is only based on the 
following criteria (cf. Table 3): barrier initiation, presentation of information of a 
barrier system, frequency of interaction with a barrier system, and available time. 
The second and third criteria are taken together in order to determine whether the 
human processing of a barrier system is automated or not. According to Table 4, one 
obtains a score between 1 (highest reliability) and 7 (lowest reliability) for a barrier. 
For example, in case of the above barrier against speeding (passive initiation, no 
time pressure, three times non-automated human processing) this yields a score of 5. 
Table 4: A possible approach to a barrier’s reliability (Hammerl 2011) 
  no time pressure time pressure 
  active initiation passive init. active initiation passive init. 
number of 
non-
automated 
human 
processing 
 0 1 2 3 4 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 2 3 4 5 6 
>2 4 5 6 7 
      
Comparing to the CAHR method 
A central part of the SMSmod project is to analyze some event data provided by 
Deutsche Bahn using the second generation human reliability assessment method 
CAHR (“Connectionism Assessment of Human Reliability”) developed by Sträter 
(2000). This way we obtained basic reliabilities for some human-machine 
interactions we could compare to our results. Despite the small number of 
interactions that could be modeled with both methods in a comparable way so far, 
the comparison indicates that Hammerl’s approach is generally valid: an interaction 
rated with a higher score than another one was accordingly rated less reliable than 
the other one by CAHR in all cases. The comparison also gave an impression of the 
range of reliabilities that is covered by the scores. It appeared that the scores are 
nearly linearly distributed on a certain reliability interval, but might not sufficiently 
differentiate high reliabilities. 
Summary and Future Work 
We extended the work on human-barrier interaction by Hammerl (2011) in several 
directions: further complexity criteria were proposed as well as a more elaborate 
notation, partly based on Wickens’ multiple resource theory. The extensions 
preserve the original aim to develop a method which is based on cognitive psycholo-
gical findings but can be applied by railway engineers without a psychological 
background. The method was used for a simple assessment of the reliability of some 
barriers which proved to be sound when compared to results of the CAHR method. 
One direction for future work might be to investigate parallel tasks via overlay of 
sequence message charts. Also, the sequence message charts could be completed by 
some new notation in order to make the few remaining criteria visible. Towards a 
semi-quantitative assessment of human reliability, the next step would be to integrate 
further criteria taking interdependencies of the criteria into account. For a better 
scaling and calibration reliability results for further barriers from other methods are 
needed; in order to calibrate the impact of important performance shaping factors, 
one might use again CAHR results complemented by simulation studies. 
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